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If this is the heartbeat of America, maybe I should change jobs
and sell Chevies. Professor Wilner, thank you, and in absentia, Dean
Ellington, and President Sohn. As is customary in gatherings such
as this, the participants usually commend the conveners for convening
such a distinguished group; and if that is not presumptuous enough,
we usually do it before we say anything. But in this case, I do want
to join those who have preceded me in thanking the students here
at the University of Georgia School of Law for putting in a tremendous amount of work. With all that is going on in Eastern Europe
and the Soviet Union, and in every continent except Antarctica, the
topics of this meeting could not be more timely.
I also want to take the opportunity to thank Professor Sohn not
only for convening this group, but for being, as was suggested earlier,
not only Mr. International Law, but Mr. Human Rights. There is
little which is being discussed today, that has been discussed for a
long time, and that will be discussed for a long time to come in
these areas which does not emanate from the massive amount of
information and insight and intelligence of Professor Sohn, and we
thank you.
Yesterday's Washington Post had an article by former Austrian
ambassador Henry Greenwald captioned "We Can Manage Without
an Enemy." It suggested that during the current sea changes in Eastern
Europe, the Soviet Union, and elsewhere we need to understand how
we function differently in this world, what our foreign policy is going
to be, and how it will evolve if we do not have the evil empire
lurking over our shoulder. Certainly that article and I are not the
first to suggest that all of the changes going on in other countries
are highlighting the fact that the United States right now, not necessarily being caught short, is in a position for the first time in a
long time of having to give serious reevaluation to what our foreign
policy is in relationship to that of our domestic policy. I mention
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that because obviously the nexus of those two in many instances is
international treaties and the consideration of those treaties by the
Congress.
There also was in recent weeks an editorial piece in Time Magazine
which I thought nicely defines much of what we are dealing with
here. The thesis of that editorial was that questions of human rights
are not a footnote in the foreign policy of this country or in any
other country. Human rights are not some afterthought to which all
we need to give is lip service; they are, as the article highlighted,
what the fight is all about. Again, I would only note that in the
context of what is going on in the world (the United States v. VerdugoUrquidez decision concerning the applicability of certain of our constitutional protections extraterritorially, the pending cases against
Marcos, the action by the United States in Panama, and the extradition of Mr. Noriega to the United States to stand trial) we are
discussing very significant kinds of questions relative to the applicability of domestic United States law overseas. What we are talking
about in this context is the increasing establishment of an international
law of human rights. This law exists, but how do we apply it domestically in the United States, and what would be the meaning of
this law relative to our relations with other countries?
If the events going on right now, and in this last year, were in a
military context, they would be called a revolution. The fact that
they are not military-the fact that they are happening quietly, and
not only quietly but certainly peacefully-ought to suggest that it is
no less of a revolution because of the changes they are bringing into
the world that we are functioning in now. I would like to focus
quickly on two general areas, as a follow-up to Professor Sohn's
presentation, and then to open up discussion following Professor
Lillich's presentation.
The first area, adhering to our topic of process and obstacles to
ratification of human rights instruments, is briefly what that process
is. As lawyers, we all know that you do not have to talk about
process and obstacles in separate breaths; we are here, and all of
you are spending huge amounts of money to be taught how the
process is an obstacle, all the time. And it is no less so in the
consideration of human rights treaties, or for that matter for any
treaty. The basic process that we are talking about is established by
Article 2, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution, which provides
that the President shall have the power by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate to make treaties, providing two-thirds of the
Senate goes along. The implementation is established through the
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rules of the Senate and the rules of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee. If you go back to the time before all of this became the
law of the land, and I refer to both Hamilton's and Jay's papers in
the Federalist Papers, it is instructive that at that time there was a
good bit of confusion and pitched debate over whether the treaty
making power should be in the President, the Senate, or both houses
of Congress. The initial draft that came out in fact had the Senate
as the sole body responsible for treaties. It was only later that those
who felt that treaties were a strange bird-they are not really legislation and not really foreign policy, but something in the middlewith the President to the process. I would only say at the beginning
of this discussion that that indeed raises problems, particularly domestic political problems in getting treaties through the Senate. But
I think that the basic notion of involvement both of the Senate and
of the President is one that should be maintained, because we are
dealing with something that is more significant than purely domestic
legislation. It raises a number of questions which, although they
already get wrapped up in domestic political concerns, still need to
have the active involvement of both branches.
The process, as most of you know from Professor Sohn, that we
are talking about here is one which begins with negotiation of treaties,
proceeds through the signing of a treaty (which concludes the negotiating process), and moves on to the approval by the Senateadvice and consent, if you will-of that treaty, thereafter ratification
by the President, exchange of ratification documents with other parties, and ultimately the proclamation by the United States that we
are now a party to this treaty. The responsibility of the Senate to
participate both in advising and consenting to the ratification of a
treaty is a distinction which is not frequently discussed publicly or
very carefully, but it is an important one to keep in mind. Although
our focus here is specifically the responsibility of the Senate, in
consenting to ratification of a treaty, the advising responsibility of
the Senate, indeed of both houses of Congress, is, I think, a given.
I do not know when I would mark the beginning of it, but the
involvement of Congress began either in passing simple resolutions
in either house concerning various foreign policy activities or the
participation of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the
House Foreign Affairs Committee and a lot of people who are not
even in Congress in suggesting how the President ought to undertake
negotiations in the arms control area. The law of the sea was mentioned earlier as another area where there was very heavy Congressional involvement in advising the President during the negotiation
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process. It frequently takes on a less formal role, but has increasingly
taken on a more important role for the simple reason that what we
are talking about ultimately is making a political judgment in the
United States that a particular treaty ought to be approved; and
where we find difficulty, we find there is either ignorance or a lack
of broad-based support for that treaty. This involvement of more
elements of Congress, particularly the Senate, in formal negotiations
with the Executive Branch during negotiations with the United Nations,
the Organization of American States, or in various bilateral treaties,
is a clock that cannot be turned back. In addition, it is essential for
the Executive to know that its negotiations have support in the body
which ultimately must give advice and consent to ratification.
The process following the negotiation commences with a formal
submission by the President of an executive document to the Senate.
That document is accompanied by an opinion of the Secretary of
State, usually a memorandum of law to the President outlining the
conclusion of the negotiations, the summary of the content of the
treaty, and any recommended qualifications, which is to say reservations, declarations, or understandings to the ratification document.
The President then submits this package, which again is not done in
a vacuum. It is the result of negotiations between the Congress,
particularly the Senate, before that document has even been submitted.
Again, it is for the simple reason, not dissimilar from any other
aspect of the legislative process, that the President does not want to
undertake the initiative if there ultimately is no support for it in
Congress. Following the submission, it is hoped that the next step
will be for the Foreign Relations Committee to undertake formal
public hearings to hear both from the Executive Branch and from
various nongovernmental organizations and others who may have
something to say about the treaty. The initial difficulty comes at this
stage, and one point that I want to highlight here, and we can get
back to later on in terms of any possible needed changes in the
process, is one of time. Almost exactly a year ago, the administration
submitted a document to the Senate calling for Senate advice and
consent to ratification of the United Nations Torture Convention.
The Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights, under the latter
part of President Reagan's tenure and currently under President Bush,
was very heavily involved in negotiating that treaty, and he remains
in office today. There is provided some continuity which I suggest
is an important reason why a treaty submitted just a year ago had
its hearings concluded a month ago. Serious negotiations with the
Defense Department, the State Department, and the Justice Depart-
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ment led to various qualifiers being attached to that treaty before
the hearings were concluded.

The process, in a nutshell, has functioned as it should. I will
compare that to a number of the treaties that Professor Sohn mentioned, the five other human rights treaties which have been pending
for ten years or longer, dealing with racial discrimination, discrimination against women, civil and political rights, economic, social
and cultural rights and the American Convention on Human Rights,
which will be the subject of discussion tomorrow. There have been
no hearings on these treaties. The last action taken on them was
back in 1979, the time of their initial submission by President Carter.
They are currently on the lists submitted by the Secretary of State
as under study, as opposed to the Torture Convention, which has
top priority and is moving very quickly. I draw this distinction for
a moment, not getting into any substantive concerns about any of
these treaties, but merely to highlight that a treaty, as opposed to
legislation, is a continuing matter of business before the Senate of
the United States.
At the conclusion of a Congress, legislation which ultimately has
not been passed and been sent to the President dies; a treaty does
not. That is good news, because you do not have to go through the
whole process of redrafting and resubmitting. The bad news is that
if you do not act on it relatively quickly, then you get further away
in time from those responsible for initially negotiating the treaty.
There is not the kind of institutional knowledge, commitment, nor
the kind of ownership of the issue which will bring it to fruition.
There are many other reasons why some of these treaties may not
have moved ahead, and it is always dangerous to generalize in this
way just as it is dangerous to generalize as to why the Torture
Convention is moving so quickly. But this time lapse does deserve
serious thought and needs to be kept in mind in advocating any of
these treaties. It will not do to simply say how outrageous it is that
a treaty has been pending for so long. Who opposes the establishment
or recognition of basic civil and political rights which the rest of the
world has recognized? We are not dealing with somebody writing an
article or giving a speech; we are dealing with members of Congress.
Unless there is some commitment to what is going to happen or some
attachment to the initial negotiating process, we are a long way away,
unfortunately, from President Roosevelt and those that brought us
into the current age of international human rights. That is half of
the bad news. The other half of the bad news is that many of their
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progeny have not been acted upon because of the passage of time.
Ultimately it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.
The hearings serve an important function not in and of themselves,
but for what they represent. The Torture Convention is an example.
It was stated to be a top priority of the administration. Of all of
the pending treaties, those of us who have been working on these
were of the view, just in political terms, that nobody could support
torture. Well, we all know some people can practice torture, but who
is going to say they are not against torture? And so we thought it
would be easier to proceed with this particular treaty. When the
Foreign Relations Committee scheduled hearings last fall, there were
some initial meetings with some people from Amnesty International
(from whom you will hear later). Then the hearings were put off
because of some conflicts. The pressure of having all of us testify,
and then the administration appearing before the public in a hearing
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and saying it wanted this
treaty but with the certain qualifications attached to it, did a terrific
job of getting the attention of all of us involved in the process. I
believe the hearings were scheduled and canceled for various reasons
on three or four different occasions, but the final result was, and it
really was a textbook example of how this should work and rarely
does, that by the end of last year, the administration had done all
of its internal negotiating. It had its ducks in a row, and it had
concluded what its position was. That made it easier for all of the
other nongovernmental organizations and for the Senate to give some
thought as to what their positions were. Instead of a process of
fencing and bidding to and seeing if you get to bid on the other
side, it was a fairly decent process in a regulatory context. I would
refer to it as regulatory negotiations of everybody with an interest
in the process sitting down around the table, laying their cards down,
and talking honestly and directly. The result of it was very sound.
Very little came out of some of the hearings. As you may know,
rarely is a mind changed in a Congressional hearing. In fact, rarely
is anything of much significance said in a Congressional hearing. But
it is a good opportunity to force the process of establishing a record.
There are some members of the Supreme Court now who suggest
that legislative history means very little unless the face of a statute
is so unalterably unclear that we cannot make any sense out of it.
Being relatively closely involved in the legislative process, and without
expressing an ideological view, there is sound reason for that concern.
The statements made in hearings and subsequent discussions resulting
in a report to the Senate on a treaty are carefully worked out by

1990]

HUMAN RIGHTS ROUNDTABLE

the administration, by outside organizations who have been particularly involved, and by various Senators who have had an interest
in the issue.
The concern during the hearings simply was where will the opposition, if it exists, likely come from? You are never sure if it is
going to come out at a public hearing; it may happen in a nonpublic
setting. But frequently it does happen publicly before the Foreign
Relations Committee, and in this case it did. We were somewhat
concerned, given the experience with the Genocide Convention, that
Senator Helms might be reliably expected to raise concerns about
infringements on the sovereignty of the United States and some of
the concerns along the lines of the Bricker Amendment which Professor Sohn alluded to earlier. Indeed he did, and this is another
helpful element of public hearings, because no number of private
meetings with staff ultimately can get you to the position of a Senator
as Senator Helms did at these hearings. He asked questions that had
been raised in the context of other treaties, not necessarily human
rights treaties. It was important to know on the record that these
concerns existed and that he was prepared to advocate these concerns.
He was concerned because he felt that he had not been consulted
sufficiently. All of these are pieces of information that sort of get
put into the computer to make judgments, ultimately political judgments and legal judgments of how to proceed with the ratification
process. But in this case, the statements Senator Helms and a couple
of other senators made at the hearing were very instructive, not for
the substance of what was said so much as for the signal that there
was some possible concern and some possible opposition, and, in
any event, the Convention was not necessarily going to be a quick
pass. The result is that there are continuing meetings with outside
organizations and government people, both with Senator Helms and
with other members of the Foreign Relations Committee, to make
sure that any additional questions that might exist are resolved and
the report is definitely prepared by the Committee.
At the conclusion of this part of the process, when the Committee
feels that the opposition has been overcome, or simply that the votes
exist on the side of the chairman to do whatever the chairman wishes
to do, the Committee moves as it does in any other legislative process
to what is called "mark-up" or formal consideration of the provisions
of the treaty. It can consider, as was the case with the Panama Canal
Treaties where the Foreign Relations Committee considered and ultimately the floor of the Senate approved, amendments to the treaty
itself. Given the nature of a multilateral treaty, amendments to the
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treaty are frowned upon. This is because if, as was proposed by the
opponents of the Genocide Convention, an amendment is successfully
made to a treaty or proposed, and there is a vote on the Senate
floor to amend the conventions, that will be viewed almost universally
by every other party to that convention as a nonratification by the
United States, unless it involves only a very miniscule or technical
area. Change of the body of the treaty itself is viewed, as in contract
law, as a counter-offer, and is not viewed as a ratification. For this
reason, although the Foreign Relations Committee and ultimately the
Senate gives consideration to the treaty itself, changes in the text of
the treaty are not made in the amendments to the treaty. Rather,
they are made in qualifying language to the resolution which carries
the treaty to the Senate floor for resolution and ratification.
The process, increasingly in the last couple of years, and not just
in the context of human rights treaties, has begun to develop some
precedent which troubles a number of people because issues are raised
which increasingly are not even contested. I am not saying that they
should be contested, but it is moving us into a new area where
qualifications to treaties are beginning to redefine what we mean by
treaty law. I was amused last year at a program on the pending
treaties by a response from one of the most well regarded human
rights advocates in Great Britain, commenting that she hoped that
the United States would put no qualifiers whatsoever on any of the
pending treaties. She hoped that the United States simply would ratify
the treaties, even though there some provisions coming close to or
causing problems with various Constitutional protections in the United
States. There was general support for what she was saying, until it
was pointed out by one of the participants in that panel discussion
that, as opposed to Great Britain, the United States has this little
thing called a written Constitution. There are certain protections which
we must take. It simply highlights the fact that we are not necessarily
dealing in each of these cases with substantive provisions of a treaty,
but rather the applicability of those provisions to the domestic law
of the signatory country.
Following consideration by the Foreign Relations Committee, the
treaty and the resolution for ratification will then be sent to the
Senate for formal advice and consent. As you know, the final vote
on whether to give advice and consent to ratification requires a twothirds vote; all of the votes up to that point on additions to or
amendments to any of the provisions of the resolution of ratification
are simply by majority vote. This can be troubling because it takes
only a majority, as we found in a couple of the recent treaties, to
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approve a reservation along the lines of the one which was recommended on the Torture Convention and which is just a rewrite of
the general provisions of the Bricker Amendment, to which Professor
Sohn alluded. The reservation is that nothing in this ratification will
suggest that the United States will permit this treaty to direct us to
do anything which is otherwise prohibited by the United States Constitution. Last time any of us checked, we were not allowed to do
anything prohibited by the United States Constitution. When we raised
that issue, the response was all you are doing is stating a fact. Why
do we not just put it in to make sure nobody is going to violate the
Constitution? It is a very troubling provision, but one, I fear, that
is going to be with us continually. It is troubling in part because it
is a throwback to a different age. It is a throwback to a time when
the understanding of treaties, and particularly international human
rights law, was in its infancy. There were certainly human rights
issues before the United Nations, but the contemporary history of
what we are talking about began at that time. All of the concern
about the United Nations and world governments and what international law is really all about still hangs on in some corners of the
Senate and public generally. These are the issues with which we must
continue to deal.
Then follows what is expected to be the successful approval by
the Senate. The last treaty the Senate disapproved was the Versailles
treaty. I think the Montreal Aviation Protocols, which in 1983 received
a bare majority, thus falling short of the two-thirds vote required,
is the first time in 60 or 70 years that the Senate considered but did
not approve a treaty. Usually the process that I have outlined here
is so lengthy and cumbersome that a vote is not likely ever to take
place on a controversial issue like the Panama Canal Treaties or
some arms control treaties, unless the administration, along with the
leadership in the Senate, is certain that the ultimate vote will be
successful.
The action following the Senate's approval of the resolution of
ratification raises two very interesting and relatively new questions.
One is that increasingly issues of whether treaties are non-self-executing have been raised where the treaty is one to which the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee has attached a declaration simply stating
that the United States will not deposit the articles of ratification until
implementing legislation is passed. This, of course, is closely tied to
the reservation that we have just been discussing, and it goes to the
fear that a treaty is somehow superior to the Constitution of the
United States. Such a concern is relieved by requiring that imple-
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menting legislation be enacted by both houses of Congress and the
President. This is a way of changing domestic law as opposed to
changing or establishing domestic law simply through the ratification
of a treaty. It is increasingly the case that implementing legislation
is used if the Constitution simply calls for the role of the Senate.
This is because, in a very real sense, the political reality of today
requires a role for the entire Congress. The implementing legislation
on the Genocide Convention, and undoubtedly on any of the other
treaties that we are now considering, involved both the House and
the Senate. Interestingly, many Senators do not think that there is
anything more to do after acting on a treaty, even if they inserted
a declaration saying that the Senate will require implementing legislation. But the involvement of the House of Representatives, as a
much more broadly based body and one which is much more closely
in tune with domestic politics, raises both helpful expectations and
possible concerns, because the responsibility entrusted to the Senate
by the founders, in conjunction with the President, is becoming an
issue of pure domestic politics. The involvement of both houses in
the consideration of implementing legislation necessarily raises this
issue. I am not so certain that it is a bad development. If you get
away from the issue of slowing down the process, I think that the
importance of international human rights and the increasing applicability of them is enhanced, not detracted, by the involvement of
the House of Representatives in enacting implementing legislation.
Although there are problems associated with it, I think that it is not
likely to be changed soon. I think it will establish a foundation upon
which international human rights, particularly as established by treaties, will more and more be accepted not just as something we have
done in a document, but something which is immediately applicable
in our country.
Let me take about two more minutes to talk about a couple of
concerns which all of this raises. The process which I have just gone
through presents plenty of obstacles, and the more lawyers become
involved in that process, the more obstacles we encounter. There are
other questions which are raised and on which Professor Lillich will
focus. One of them, to which I have been alluding throughout, is
domestic policy-making, or domestic politics. This might be known
as the political realities of an issue. One of the political realities, for
instance, of a treaty that otherwise ought to be one of the first ones
up because it concerns this hemisphere is the American Convention
on Human Rights. It is most immediately affecting us. It is in effect;
the Inter-American Commission and Court of Human Rights are
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functioning, and they are handing down opinions which are having
an effect. The Convention has been pending before the Senate for
10 years. It contains some language regarding the right-to-life and
abortion. One way or another, and regardless of one's view of the
issue, the mere existence of that language is one of the political
realities, I suspect, of why that convention has not moved on in the
United States. The other political reality is that you do not speak
publicly about problems of that nature. If you do discuss them, it
becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. For instance, everybody in this
room might go out and say that the reason they are not moving the
American Convention on Human Rights is because of the abortion
issue. So, although I mentioned it with some hesitation, the fact of
the matter is that all of these treaties raise controversial issues, whether
abortion or any other issue that may currently be of political concern
in a country. This highlights the fact that probably more than in the
consideration of domestic legislation, perceptions are more important
than the reality of what we are dealing with. I say that generally
because of another problem, the general ignorance both of the Senate
and the public on what treaties are all about. Because of this ignorance, and the uncertainty about just what it is we are doing by
ratifying a treaty, there is a real skittishness to get anywhere near
it. There is this sense that, as is the case where the ratification of a
treaty means something a little more than just passing legislation, it
commits us to do things relative to other countries which domestic
legislation may not necessarily make us do.
In treaty consideration, domestic partisan politics are not unique
to any other public policy formation. I think it is difficult to understand why treaties on racial discrimination and discrimination
against women have been pending so long if it is not for some
domestic political concern that the treaties would disadvantage or
alienate some constituency. I do think, however, that some of those
treaties do raise questions in another area, and that is, dare I say
it, substantive questions of concern about the provisions of the treaty.
Particularly in human rights treaties, as opposed to others, it is
uniquely difficult for advocates of the treaty to say that this is a
problem and that we need to address it. This seems to suggest that
the treaty itself is flawed, that we cannot move ahead with it, and
that we somehow made a mistake in the negotiating process. In short,
it is difficult for us to say that while this is a great treaty, there are
some problems with it which we need to address. I think that we
are going to see this in the Convention on the Rights of Children.
This treaty has not yet been submitted to the Senate and has already
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received a great deal of publicity. It is an important document. It
attempts to cover civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights
all in one document. It is a good document and a good treaty. But
there are parts of it which probably are not good relative to the
domestic laws of the United States. It will be difficult for people to
say those things. If they do criticize the treaty, it will be perceived
as somehow not dealing with the merits of the treaty; that somehow
they are speaking against children. Who wants to speak against kids?
Probably the same people who believe in torture.
Finally, and I alluded to this in the beginning, a major obstacle
in the consideration of any of these treaties is a failure in determining
the ownership of the treaty. And by this I mean who has an interest
in it? Do any of you have a greater interest than I in discrimination
against women, torture, or in civil and political rights? No. Is there
a particular constituency? Perhaps there is in the Convention on
Racial Discrimination and the Convention on the Discrimination against
Women. But, in fact, probably not. The defining characteristic of a
human rights treaty, as opposed to many other private international
law treaties, is that they are not dealing with certain kinds of bilateral
negotiations or tax benefits to citizens of this country or another;
they are broadly applicable to everyone. And this comes down to
the political reality of whether that treaty is owned, advocated, and
pushed by the President, and whether outside organizations own and
feel strongly enough about the treaty that they will push the President
to push for the treaty. If neither of these happen, as we see right
now with five of these pending treaties, it is the fault of there having
been too much time between the negotiation of treaty and its ratification. As a result, the current President, although it was the
Executive that negotiated the treaty, does not feel any involvement
with it, any ownership of the treaty, nor does he feel he has a stake
in it. Those of us on the outside advocating treaties may push publicly
in the Congress that they ought to be ratified, but unless we succeed
in pushing the Executive to own this issue, we are not going to
succeed.
I will conclude by suggesting that a lot of this raises in my and
others' minds the notion that we ought to give some thought to
establishing in Congress, either by law, or by rule adopted by both
Houses, a process along the lines of what was adopted a number of
years ago for the Budget process. We have seen how well that has
worked. Nevertheless, we ought to give some thought to establishing
a discipline, a regimen, or a time frame within which treaties should
be considered. Although the Senate under its rules has the authority
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to send a treaty back to the President and the President has the
authority to request the return of a treaty, it is rarely done. What
would the public think if the President said, "Send me back the
Racial Discrimination Treaty." He would not do it, but what he is
doing now is just sitting on it. A process that would push for and
require a treaty once submitted to be ratified within a certain period
of time ought to move through the various hoops. If it is not
concluded, then the Senate ought to return it to the President.

